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INTRODUCTION
The Plaintiffs argue in then principal brief that §38-9-1, the wrongful lien
statute should be applied to a notice of interest filed pursuant to § 57-9-4 Utah Code
Annotated.
The Plaintiffs argument is twofold. First, even though §57-9-4 authorizes a
notice of interest may, the notice may be summarily dissolved pursuant to the provisions of
§38-9-1 et seq. (wrongful lien statute). Second, the defendants, in any event, were not
entitled to file a notice of interest pursuant to §57-9-4 of the Utah Code Annotated.
ARGUMENT
I.
§38-9-1 et seq. is a summary process which, on its face, is not applicable
to Notices of Interest filed pursuant to §57-9-4, Utah Code Annotated.
The argument that the wrongful lien statute (§38-9-1, et seq.) applies to
notices of interest filed under a separate statute requires a giant circular leap of judgment.
§38-9-1 (6) (a) provides as follows:
"Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a
lien or encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real
property and at the time it is recorded or filed is not
(a)

expressly authorized by this chapter or another
state or federal statute.

A notice of interest is expressly authorized by a state statute (§57-9-4). On the face of the
statute then the wrongful lien statute cannot apply to any notice of interest filed pursuant to
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§57-9-4. Plaintiffs argument that a Court is entitled to determine whether or not a notice
of interest is valid under the wrongful lien statute is without merit and, in any event, not
previously asserted by the plaintiff below.
The case is one of first impression - as to the applicability of the wrongful lien statute
to a notice of interest The essence of the plaintiffs argument and the Court's decision is, and
always has been, that plaintiff could file a lis pendens to protect its interest and therefore,
notice of interest could not be filed. Because the wrongful lien statute is a summary process,
it clearly was not designed to apply a notice of interest specifically authorized by the
legislature.
II.
Defendant is entitled to a Notice of Interest on the property in question.
The Court below cannot use the summary process designed by §38-9-1 etseq.
to determine the validity of a notice of interest. Even if such an analysis was permitted by
the statute defendant's notice of interest is proper.
The essence of plaintiffs argument that defendant was not entitled to a notice
of interest is that defendant had a bare contract right and not an interest in land, which
plaintiff argues is required to file a notice of interest The defendant was granted by the
plaintiffs a right to a trust deed, which the plaintiff failed to provide. Therefore, the
defendant's remedy was to file a notice of interest that defendant is entitled to a trust deed
pursuant to the parties' agreement. Whether or not the defendant' s right to a trust deed arises
to an interest in land has already been decided by the Court below when it concluded that
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the defendant's interest was an interest in land, based upon its findings that defendants could
have filed a lis pendens to protect their interest. A lis pendens represents a notice to the
world that a person or entity claims an interest in land. §78-40-2 provides as follows: *
"In any action affecting the title to, or the right of possession of,
real property the plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint or
thereafter, and the defendant at the time of filing his answer
when affirmative relief is claims in such answer, or at any time
afterward, may file for record with the recorder of the county in
which the property or some part thereof is situated a notice of
the pendency of the action, containing the names of the parties,
the object of the action or defense, and a description of the
property in that county affected thereby. From the time of filing
such notice for record only shall a purchase or encumbrancer of
the property affected thereby be deemed to have constructive
notice of the pendency of the action . . . "
Clearly the Court's finding of fact that defendant's remedy was tofilean action
and a lis pendens is controlling as to the facts on appeal.
III.
The notice of interest statute (§57-9-4) in plain language permits the filing of a notice
when a person claims an interest in land. The purpose for the creation of the notice of
interest statute is for those situations (such as that before the Court) where a person or entity
claims an interest in land, but does not have a recordable document. On its face, the
wrongful lien statute excludes from its summary adjudication provisions the notice of
interest filed by the defendants.
The Court cannot use the summary process to invalidate properly recorded notice of
interest.
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The logical extension plaintiffs argument would permit the wrongful lien statute to
apply to a mechanic's lien and have it summarily dismissed which, on its face, the statute did
not intend to do.
The statute on its face is to provide a summary disposition of those wrongful liens
which otherwise are not authorized by statutes. Where a statute authorizes the recordation
as does §57-9-4, there is a mechanism for the orderly disposition, such as mechanics liens,
and notices of interest.
There are no Utah cases which provide direction for the Court in this area of the law.
It has long been held in other jurisdictions, that an executory contract, the effect of which
is to convey or transfer an equitable title, is a conveyance or transfer within recording laws.
Keese v. Bardlev. 190 Cat. 213 P. 500.
The plaintiffs remedy to deal with the notice of interest is to either or both file an
action for quite title or slander of title.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above the Courts decision below should be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of November, 1999.
BLACK, STIIH^ARGYLE, P.C.

David O. Black, AttomeyToTDefendmrts—-—__
and Appellants
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